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THE NOVELTY OF LATIN AMERICA: GLOBALIZATIONS, FUTURES, AND NATIONS*

PART I

"We have now sunk to a depth where the restatement of the obvious is our duty" George Orwell

Abstract: This essay argues that Latin America created a modern cutting edge design of the nation and national identity long before Europe. In many aspects, it was more modern than the United States. The region is seen as a *modernizer* and *globalizer* rather than a mere recipient of influences. In light of these findings, the essay revisits theories of the Nation, National Identity, Modernization and Globalization. Most literature on the construction of national identity and nationalism focuses on communal past experiences and history to explain the nation. Rather, I claim that a different dimension and intellectual construct, *'the future of the nation'*, provides one of the most fundamental building blocks of national identity in the modern world.

***** The views and opinions expressed in this essay are the author's alone, and do not represent those of the Universidad Del CEMA.

INTRODUCTION

Latin America as a Modernizer

The novelty of Latin America is significant and has gone largely unnoticed. Many factors have contributed to such neglect, not the least of which are prejudice, lack of information about its modernity, and the strong influence of Anglo-American literature which has ignored the region both as a definer of modernity and globalization. In Modernization, World Systems, Dependency, and International Relations theory, Latin America is portrait as a receptor rather than as a producer of modernity and a poor contributor to the consolidation of the modern West. Because in these theories Latin America is conceived as a part of a larger periphery roughly ranked in terms of degrees of development or political stability, their arguments have missed the innovative role played by the area in processes of modernization. And yet the region has been a modernizer and a 'globalizer'.

A very important contribution of Latin America to the process of modernity and globalization has been its cutting edge construction of national identity and the nation, in connection with the crafting of nation-states under Republican arrangements. All these developments marked, among others, the consolidation of modernity in the West and elsewhere. To view them as such changes, in many ways, our conception of modernity and our understanding of globalization. Their importance for the re-formulation of theories of modernity and globalization will be discussed below. Their novelty

and impact globally were great, and this can be seen when one compares them with similar processes taking place in the Old World. United by common ethnicities, languages, and history, nations were part of the European landscape long before the sixteenth century. Most of them lived, for centuries, under the ruling of the same state, e.g., empires, protectorates, or kingdoms. The advent of the modern world marked a shift toward the emergence of smaller states. These ruled over lesser number of nations, until the one state-one nation formula became the rule rather than the exception. This took more than a century. During the first wave of globalization (1870-1920) this process acquired global dimensions and advanced faster, especially as a result of WWI.

As we shall see, Europe and Latin America represent very different and yet complementary processes of nation-state formation; both of them contribute to our understanding of modernity and both of them should be taken as examples of the complexities of globalization. Since the late eighteenth century in Europe large states started to shrink as nations sought to live under smaller states that, supposedly, represented their interests better. Nations tended to precede the state (Germany) although examples of states making their own nations also emerged in Europe (France). In either case, the one state-one nation formula and Republican rule were exceptional. In Latin America, contrastingly, the modern one state-one nation formula was established from the beginning. And, despite the early hesitation of countries like Mexico which remained for a short while loyal to Fernando VII, in Latin America and after Independence Republican

arrangements were quickly established as the norm. One can easily argue that the region was, in terms of the requirements of modernity as accepted by the paradigms of the time, more *avant-garde* and modern. In Europe, nations try to create or contribute to construct their own states; in Latin America, the state created, for the most part, the nation. Native American nations and identities were rapidly transformed, eliminated, or segregated, despite the fact that the emerging states were weak. As we shall soon see, these processes of nation making are seldom compared; nonetheless, they do contribute to a better understand both modernity and globalization.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ruling elites in Latin America tried hard to glue state and nation together. The nation-state formula found in Latin America its strongest support; worldwide; the region hosted the largest number of republics and nation-states featuring the one nation-one state modern model. One can argue that during the first wave of globalization Latin America tried to create a strong link between the state and the nation, a nation that, still in construction, was nonetheless conceived as a unit and in tandem with the state. As this book will show, the one state-one nation model was ravaged by strong tensions from its beginnings. What is in fact remarkable is that it lasted as long as it has. As it has been noticed, modernity is usually unstable precisely because its dynamics create rapid change, maladjustments, and especially in this case, tensions between state and nation. Latin America is a living proof.

During the present wave of globalization, the glue that held together state and nation seems to be melting. This is one of the most remarkable events of twentieth first century globalization. And it must be understood both as part of globalization and the overall, the evolution of Latin American modernity. A modernity that, curiously enough, may come back full circle to the old *one state-many nations* model that dominated Europe before WWI. The cases of Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, Guatemala, and Paraguay, where different cultural identities and nations are now challenging the one state-one nation formula presents an opposite scenario when compared with today's Europe. In the Old World and during the present wave of globalization the one state-one nation formula has grown stronger than ever. This is also true globally. Nation-states have, indeed, multiplied worldwide in recent years. While by the beginning of the 1980s we had 156 states, by the opening of the 1990s we could already count 163. At the time of writing we have 187 states in the global system with Asia, Africa and Europe having the largest numbers (49, 54, and 48 respectively). [1] Therefore, Latin America pioneered a modern model of the nation-state that long after, especially during the second wave of globalization, has expanded globally. Below, I will argue that Latin America's design of the nation, or at least the design of the nation that most of the region adopted and which was crafted during the first wave of globalization,

[1] Many nation-states are of very recent data: in the 1980s seven were created and in the 1990s twenty three new states emerged. Others are not still full-fledged states, and still others have failed in their attempt to unify and centralize power. Failed states remain a minority within the global system.

introduces a very important, largely unnoticed variable in our theorizing about the nation and national identity.

This was a modular notion of the nation in which the construction of the future, as a building bloc, was as important as history, common ethnicity, race or language. Images of a future of progress and prosperity for the nation dominated the imaginary of elites and citizens alike, to the point of constituting a central part of its definition. The “emotional attachment” that so many since Max Weber have argued to be a necessary condition of nation building, finds a fundamental source of strength in the future, rather than the past. “Imagining” the nation in this particular way, to use a terminology made popular by Benedict Anderson, calls for a correction of current literature. Most writings on the subject attribute an overwhelming importance to history, past group experiences, and the past in general when forging the nation and conceptualizing it; this book claims that the future is, at least, as important.

As we shall see in Part II, this conceptualization of the nation in which future developments weighed as much as the past, was intricately connected with globalization. From the late 1860s to the 1920s changes in paradigms, the rise and fall of international powers, the revolution experienced by the arts, changes in culture and scientific research, advances in communication technology and immigration, contributed to shape and conceptualize the nation. An interaction of factors that closely resembled what many regions of the word are experiencing today, at the end of the first decade of the twentieth first century

Is the question of modernity important? The tendency to find post-modernity behind every single instance in which modernization appears to be challenged or transformed, has blinded many scholars and observers to the fact that most of the features of our contemporary world remain, by en large, modern. This is especially true in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East; indeed, Latin America today has been seen as a "third phase" of modernity.[2] And this is also true, although often forgotten, of most of Europe and North America. Thus, our present is still strongly connected with the process that we call "modernity". Latin America is a misinterpreted piece in theories of modernity. If this is true, and I claim it is, then we lack a comprehensive theory of Modernity. As we shall see, also Globalization theory can, in part, be found guilty of similar charges.

What about post-modernity*? Post-modernity* is still to impose itself over the modern dominant features of our world. In a sort of Hegelian "dialectical" relation with modernity, post-modernity has been thought of as the "negation" of what is modern. Yet the deconstruction of modern structures has been so far only timorous and weak. The very idea of "cycles" that would begin and end –as in Nietzsche, Hegel, or Toynbee-- is problematic. Empirical evidence, however, shows that, in Latin America and most other areas of the world our present reality reflects ongoing modernizing processes that are, so to speak, not yet "finished". The modern transformations that

[2] One argument has been to consider Latin America as a "third phase of modernity". For a good discussion on this point, see Domingues, Jose Mauricio "Social Theory, Latin America, and Modernity" in Gerard Delanty, ed., Handbook of European Social Theory, London, Sage, 2005.

took hold of the Latin America and the Iberian world during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are still at work today.

A discussion of national identity and the nation connects with modernity and therefore with one of its utmost products, the *nation-state*. Curiously enough, literatures on the state and the nation have grown separate, almost challenging the modern idea that the nation-state meant an intimate relation between the two. As a result, we do not possess a real comparative theory of the nation-state. Albeit some exceptions, for the most part the connection between the two has somehow been lost. An obvious exception seems to be Hobsbawam's work on the rise of nationalism and the formation of European nations. Yet his seminal contribution is definitely focused on nationalism rather than the nation or national identity. These are similar but not identical concepts. In addition, his main objective is not to formulate a comprehensive theory of the connection between the modern nation and the modern state.[3] Similarly, in Charles Tilly's extensive work on the European nation-state we find an important and pertinent discussion. But Tilly's main focus was the state, rather than the nation or the connection between the two.

We definitely know more about the state than about the nation-state. And while we have produced comparative work on the state we still lack comparative work on the nation and national identity. Some

[3] Hobsbawam, Eric J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge, University Press, 1990; "Inventing Tradition" in Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp 1-14, and we find also a discussion on sates and nations in Hobsbawm, Eric, The Age of Empire, 1875-1914, New York, Vintage Books, 1989.

recent comparative work on the state in Latin America, for instance, has concentrated on the state rather than the nation.[4] Institutions and the state bureaucracy have been systematically dissected since the eighteenth century. We have done research on the institutional arrangements and bureaucracies that make power centralization possible and have extensively studied the production of public policy. Of late, good efforts have been made to place Latin America in the context of philosophical and political theorizing about the state.[5] A comparative theory of the nation-state, however, is still under construction.

Of course the literature on the nation, national identity, and nationalism is overwhelming. Studies with a focus on Latin America, however, have been country-oriented and non-comparative, with a tendency to identify national identity with specific cultures, domestic historical developments, or home grown ideas about what is "ours" in contraposition with what is "foreigner". The connection between the nation and the state has been made, but loosely and with little, it seem, theoretical implications. Many times, in fact, the differentiation between the nation and the state has been left in the dark, and literature talks about both as if they were a unit of analysis. In the

[4] I am myself guilty of the same thing. And so are other colleagues who have offered welcome comparative work on the state in Latin America and Europe. See Fernando Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810-1920, Duke University Press, 2000, and Centeno, Miguel Angel, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation State in Latin America. The Pennsylvania University Press, 2002.

[5] See, for instance, the work of Agustin E. Ferraro, Reinventando el Estado: Por una adminsitracion publica democratica y professional en Iberoamerica,Instituto Nacional de Administracion Publica, Madrid, 2009.

overall literature on the nation and nationalism for the most part the connection between state and nation has been at the margins of theorizing. There are, of course, exceptions.[6] One can argue, however, that overall these two growing bodies of literature (on the state, on the nation) have hardly dialogued with each other.

There is consensus that nation and state are not the same. One is composed of institutions of governance; the other, is, for most authors, a community of sentiment. In liberal thinking and most contractual theories of the state the latter has been understood as a special community possessing a right to sovereignty and statehood. A nation has that right because its members are bound by obligations that "should be enforced as political obligations". And obviously you need the institutions of the state to achieve that. National identity can be interpreted as the bond that ties members to that special community called the nation. Or, to the specific portrait of that community called "nation" in the minds of those who are assumed to be its members. Membership in the nation no doubt does impose special kinds of obligations.[7] Conversely, a state becomes legitimate in part because of its status as a *national* state, that is, one entitled to

[6] See, for instance, Florencia Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru, University of California Press, 1995. The work of Thurner, Mark, also on Peru. From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Post-Colonial State Making in Andean Peru, Durham. Duke University Press, 1997 focuses on national identity in one case, Peru. Yet these books concentrate more on the formation of identity and fractured identities than on the dialogue between theories of identity and theories of state making.

[7] For further discussion on these points see, for instance, Guiberneau, Monserrat, Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, Polity, 1996, p 43 and passim, and Guilbert, Paul, The Philosophy of Nationalism, Westview Press, 1998, pp. 20-22.

the loyalty of its nationals. Despite all these linkages between state and nation, literature on the nation has been written, in general, from anthropological and sociological standpoints that do not encourage a dialogue with theories of the state.

Some have argued that the nation, the state, nationalism, and even patriotism indicate similar phenomena. In 1966 Morton Grodzins, analyzing the relation between individuals and nations, wrote that "there is delight in attaching one's self to a larger cause. Inner doubts are dissipated because the cause give purpose and direction to life…The mechanism is one of identification: of accepting the nations' symbols and achievements as one own, of feeling personal satisfaction as a consequence of institutional accomplishment. This identification is fostered because the nation directly satisfies personal needs by governmental programs that more and more tend to touch more and more people…the nation are looked upon as a good in itself."[8]

For Grodzins, as for others, the emotional attachment to the nation is almost one and the same with the benefits citizens receive when attaching themselves to state institutions which distribute common goods, which also strengthens patriotism and sharpens nationalism. The nation and the state (or government), are part of the same social-institutional development. This is a practical position that explains somehow the connection between states and citizens. Yet it

[8] Grodzins, Morton. The Loyal and the Disloyal: Social Boundaries of Patriotism and Treason. Meridian Books, World Publishing Company, 1966, p. 21

ignores the linkages that exist between international variables, nation building, and state formation. It also misses the importance of images and conceptions of *the national* that after the eighteenth century do not necessarily coincide, in the minds of both the ruled and the rulers, with that of the state and its institutions of government.

In addition, loyalties to the nation can be different from loyalties to the state. Connor, for instance, insists that "A nation, then, is neither a state, nor the population of a state …. Nationalism emerges as an identification with, and loyalty to, the nation, nor with or to the state. Loyalty to the state has traditionally being called patriotism." Connor conceptualizes the difference thus: "A current vogue is to differentiate the two loyalties …as ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism respectively. But using the same noun, nationalism, is misleading because it nourishes the misconception that we are dealing with two variations of the same phenomenon."[9]

Connor's suggestion is clarifying. Nationalism, however, the love of the nation, is a different notion altogether. The nation, national identity, and nationalism are not the same. Nationalism is mostly defined as a movement and/or an ideology that both shapes and defends the nation. For Erik Hobsbawam nationalism in fact can create the nation. He defines the nation as a new "entity" which is "no older than the eighteen century".[10] Nationalism, the defense of what

[9] Walker Connor, "The Dawning of Nations", in Ichijo and Uzelac, eds. When is the Nation? Routledge, 2005, p 40.

[10] Hobsbawam, Erik, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge, University Press, 1990, p. 3 and page 9.

is “ours”, preceded it. “The nation, as conceived by nationalism, can be recognized prospectively; the real nation can only be recognized *a posteriori*”.[11] In other words, nationalism can become the conceptual crafter of the nation, and the nation can be recognized as such only after the former has molded it. Nationalism, however conceived, usually leads to collective action, the formation of movements of defense of the nation, and so forth. I am not interested in a discussion of nationalism here. Rather, my focus is on how members –and at times non-members-- conceptualize the nation and the formation of national identity.

Figure 1 represents the differences among these concepts, and shows the “ingredients” that modern Latin America used in forging the nation and national identity. Image s of the future of the nation rank as a major and necessary factor in nation making; the conceptualization of the national community mostly precedes nationalism but the relation goes both ways. The reason is that in Latin America the state took precedent in the crafting of the nation but nationalism, simply as a reaction against Spain during the ward of Independence, already existed although as a poorly articulated phenomenon.

[11] Ibid. p 9. See also his discussion in pp 10-12.



Many times the nation and national identity are based on national histories created by the state and/or nationalism. Myths are no doubt important. Historical myths, symbols, and liturgy are part of the definition of the nation. They can also provide both the inspiration and content of nationalism. Sheldon Wolin tells us that "collectivities take shape historically, that is, as a matter of fact; but they come into being mythically….Their main purpose is to fix certain meanings about matters that are alleged to be fundamental because they pertain to the identity and flourishing of the whole society."[12] We can

[12] Wolin, Sheldon S. The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution. Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, pp 1-2.

say that states in Latin America and Europe made enormous efforts to "fix" those meanings. Yet this alone does not provide an adequate explanation of the nation. First, myths can also be about the future, and these can be as important as those about the past. Second, myths are not exclusively home grown. They can also reflect international influences.

In short, one of this book's goals is to establish a stronger dialogue between modernization and globalization theories in reference to the construction of the nation and national identity. Indeed, *the nation and national identity are products of modernization and, as such, should not be studied in isolation from theories of modernity and the state*. A macro picture of nation building and national identity should include an integrated discussion on modernity, state building, and globalization. A number of theories of globalization have mentioned national identity and nation building as one of many changes affecting states and regions of the global system; the discussion, however, has been so far scattered and comparative theories on these changes still in the making. In the case of Latin America most literature has focused, rather, on the state reform and neo-liberalism. [13]

[13] Curiously enough, studies on Latin America from a globalization theory perspective are still a minority within the large literature we have on the region. They have ranged from political economy, cultural, or institutional perspectives, to simply surveying the "reactions" of the region in response to globalization. In other words, the emphases have widely varied and the topics have differed, forming an eclectic although valuable collection. Among others, see Fernando Lopez-Alves and Diane Johnson, (ed.) Globalization and Uncertainty in Latin America, Praeger/Mcmillan, 2007; Robinson, William I. Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change, and Globalization, London: Verso, 2003; Chudnovsky, Daniel. "Beyond Macroeconomic Stability in Latin

A second point is to contribute to change the way we think about the nation and national identity, introducing *the future* as a constructing block of the nation. As we shall see, *the use of the future in Latin America is novel and modern, and differs from the sense of mission or predetermination that characterized the United States*. While the first Republic gained a very important place as a source of inspiration for Latin American nation makers, the final use of the future as a variable in the construction of the nation in both parts of the Americas widely differed. My third goal is to offer a correction to the way literature theorizes about Latin America, showing the region as a modernizer and globalizer rather than as a mere receptor of and reactor to global influence. Before further examining the nation and national identity, we need to start by briefly discussing the modern *nation-state* formula.

One State, One Nation: Latin America and Europe

A host of institutions have been identified with modernity: party systems, regular elections, republicanism, the predominance of democracy, liberalism and, for others, the stronger states of socialism and communism, etc. The list is enormous and not consensual. One institution, however, has been regarded as the foremost sign of

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America". In John H.Dunning and Khalil A. Hamdani (ed.) The New Globalism and Developing Countries, pp 125-154. New York, United Nations University Press, 1997; G. M. Joseph (et al.) Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations, Duke University Press, 1999; Boron, Atilio, El Buho de Minerva Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2000; Gwynne, Robert N. And Cristobal Kay, (ed) Latin America Transformed: Globalization and Modernity, London, Arnold, 1999; Lopez-Alves, Fernando, Sociedades Sin Destino: Latin America tiene lo que se merece? Buenos Aires, Taurus/ Santillana, 2002; William C. Smith and Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz, eds. Politics, Social Change, and Economic Restructuring in Latin America, Boulder, CO: North-South Center Press and Lynne Reinner Books, 1997.

modernity: the emergence of the *nation-state*. As many have shown, its construction has been all along a key aspect of modernity.[14] And its reform has become a key focus of globalization theory.

As indicated, while nations and identity are constructs connected to modernity, communities united by define identities can also be argued to precede the smaller, modern states. People have lived much longer under empires than under nation-states, and in most empires they lived as members of many "national" communities. Nevertheless, toward the end of the eighteenth century *nation-states* started to become the rule rather than the exception. That is, the one state, one nation model slowly gained predominance. Latin America represents a very important part of this global process. In Europe, political and identity boundaries tended to coincide with ethno linguistic boundaries that were not easily erasable. One of the great novelties of the French Revolution was to create the notion of voluntary membership into the nation; thus, citizenship. In the Old World this notion progressed with enormous difficulties. Yet from the onset in the Americas it provided the theoretical foundation of most newly created states.

[14] See, for instance, Charles Tilly Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990. and also *his European Revolutions, 1492–1992.* Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993. The same definition is present in Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology. Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1988. See also the same concept at work in Fernando Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, Duke University Press, 2000. Landes, David, in his The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are Rich and Some So Poor, New York, W.W. Norton and Company, 1999, also sees the nation-state as a sign of modernity.

Modernization and Liberalism promoted this *one state-one nation* equation, that is, a state for each nation rather than many nations living under the same state --as it had been historically the case in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Often ignored in terms of its relation with the state, the forging of nations becomes a crucial feature of modernity. As E. Kamenka puts it: "Since kings were to cease governing and the 'people' were to take their place, people had to be mould into some sort of unity, defined and limited in some sort of way. The concept of 'nation' thus came to the fore as a fundamental political category."[15] Where does Latin America fit in the process of modernization and the construction of modern institutions like the nation-state and national identity?

From the standpoint of the core countries that dominated the global system of the nineteenth century, Latin America remained a distant "uncivilized" and conflictive region. Yet from the standpoint of the paradigm of modernity, the new republics represented something very different. In the agenda of the dominant liberal doctrine of the time, they would classify as avant-garde examples of modern institution building. Compare with Europe. There, authoritarian, aristocratic, and imperial forms of rule were alive and well. In Latin America, instead, elites had no choice but to innovate and experiment with new and modern forms of governance. Europe remained tied to its traditions and old institutions and during the sweeping changes

[15] Kamenka Eugene "Political Nationalism: The Evolution of the Idea" in E. Kamenka (ed.) Political Nationalism: the Evolution of an Idea, Australia National University Press, Canberra, 1973, p 10

brought about by modernization states were less free to innovate. Indeed, many of them maintained the *one state-many nations'* model. Europe's advantage was that if threatened by change it could resort to its past and traditions, choosing from a wider arrange of possible types of regimes and institutions of government. The return to old monarchical rule, empire, or other forms of traditional aristocratic rule remained always a possibility, as France, Austria, Germany or Italy illustrate. A disadvantage for Europe --and an important difference with Latin America-- was that in Europe old strong national identities tended to clash with one another, presenting serious problems to the states that ruled over them.

Tied by common ethnicity, race, language, and strong shared history national communities were a mighty presence in the modern European landscape. No state seemed able to avoid their conflictive relations or to decrease their power. The nation-state model came in comparison 'late' to most of Europe. It was in 1918, after WWI was over and when the three traditional monarchies of East and Central Europe came to an end, that the formula was implemented at a grand scale. In Latin America, the modern design of the one state-one nation dominated from the early nineteenth century on. While I am not claiming that this was a better way to unite institutions of government with the communities over which they rule, I am claiming that it was part of the accepted package of modernity at the time. When at the end of WWI in Europe the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns were gone and the Romanovs had already been murdered and buried in a nameless grave during the Russian

Revolution, the dominant one state-many nations formula fell out of grace. The Sultan in Turkey, another large state that also housed many nations, was also debunked that year, although a Turkish Republic was not proclaimed until 1922.

Modern times meant, among other things, that nations that had been assembled together for centuries under the same rulers were now free to try to establish their own states. How many nations did these empires assemble? By the end of WWI the Habsburg Empire housed twelve different communities identified as “nations”. In 1887, the Russian census showed that only 43% or the total population under the Romanovs were Russians; the rest claimed to be Swedish, Germans, Kurdish Muslims, Catholic Poles, Orthodox Latvians, and so forth; by 1926, there were still 200 different nationalities and languages in the former Soviet Union. The Hohenzollern’s Empire was more homogeneous, but still housed large minorities of Poles, Alsatians, French, and Danes.[16]

The long history of the *one state many nations* model proved conflictive. Globalization did not help to sustain it. In the midst of the first wave of globalization and the intense process of modernization that started in the 1870s still Europe went to war. In fact, the century that started in 1900 was going to be the bloodiest on record, in relative as well as in absolute terms. More people were killed in the two World Wars than in any prior century, with the Second World War

[16] Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties, Harper Perennial, New York, 1991, pp19-21.

standing as the most terrible man-made catastrophe in human history. The one-nation one state model in a non-industrial setting like Latin America seems to have produced a much more peaceful twentieth century. The region did engage in civil wars and revolution. The Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), and the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions are the most well-known. Bolivia may very well qualify as member of this group as well. There have also been important conflicts between governments and rural and urban guerrillas in Salvador, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay, and Brazil. Whether some of these conflicts express tensions between nations and their own state will be discussed below; but at any rate, war among states has not been a part of this landscape.

Again, since early nineteenth century Latin America stuck to the modern *one state-one nation* formula and to republicanism. Given the ethnic, racial, and cultural diversity of a region where native identities were still alive and had started to thrive again, perhaps a more expedient formula would have been the *one state-many nations'* model. In fact, the modern chosen formula was harder to implement than it had been in the First Republic, the United States, where Native Americas had not built large and powerful civilizations like those found by the Spaniards in Latin America. In the Americas, and unlike Europe, states in formation constructed the nation. And unlike the Old Word, they seriously struggled to strengthen and maintain the modern link between one *nation* and one *state*. Again, was this formula less costly in terms of conflict? Was it easier to maintain

when whole communities who did not have access to the new power system resisted it? The answer is that it was not. Still, as we shall see, in their modernizing republican obsession, most elites followed this model and did not seriously consider other options.

In the 1920s Max Weber, following the modern conception of the nation-state, concluded that the nation was "a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own". Notice that Weber, following the German experience with state building, believed the nation (the community of solidarity and language to which the German people belonged before Bismarck united them under one state) to preexist the state. Nations, in this tradition, make their own states, rather than the other way round. [17] Italy or Russia can be viewed in a similar light. Contrastingly, in Latin America from the onset the state produced the nation. Or, better put, state and nation emerged at the same time. This simple fact, offers a rich and useful comparative angle to better understand modernity.

In terms of the implementation of the one state one nation formula, modernization in Europe resurged again after the fall of the Soviet Union when nations that wished to have their own state claimed independence.[18] Nations in Eastern Europe and parts of Central Asia declared to be autonomous countries with their own

[17] For further discussion on these points see, for instance, Guiberneau, Monserrat, Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, Polity, 1996, p 43 and passim, and Guilbert, Paul, The Philosophy of Nationalism, Westview Press, 1998, pp. 20-22.

[18] The European Union does not undermine this move toward the one state-one nation model; in fact, the nation-state constitutes its fundamental unit

territories and laws. Modernization, rather than Globalization, in a way, gave these nations the right to possess their own institutions of government. Contrastingly, indigenous communities in Latin America that shared common ethnicities, languages, races, or institutions, weakened progressively under Spanish colonial rule. Yet it was after independence that they were really debunked as possible national actors. Modernization weakened these communities. Unlike stronger states in the Old World, the weak republics of Latin America, therefore, were able to marginalize and segregate these communities, denying them the status of nations and blocking their participation in a larger nation created from above.

One major reason why nation building was a priority for the new states was that, among other things, they desperately needed legitimacy. This need for legitimacy, a typical product of modernity, rested upon the loyalty that glued members of a nation to the state. Immediately after independence Latin America states possessed no nations, or, better put, they did not possess the nations that they wished to have. Unlike Europe, modern nations and national identity had to be created almost "from scratch". A sort of white European *tabula rasa* had to be created to exclude, for the most part, Native Americans and other groups from the desired nation. Or so thought a majority among the ruling elites thorough the region, who wanted to make ruling easier and "modernize" their societies. In this modern arrangement the nation, sponsored and shaped by the state, would provide the needed legitimacy. Since the 16th century Spain also tells the story of a state painfully trying to construct a loyal nation. What is

surprising in comparing these processes of modernization is the relative slow progress of the Spanish State/Catholic Church nation building effort when compared with the results obtained by weaker republican states in its ex-colonies.

All states have to multitask. Yet these weaker states --in comparison with European states or even the Federal State in the United States—were forced to multitask to a higher degree. Modernity can come out of weaknesses. These modern nation-states started as poor and dependent, with low autonomy and capacity, with scrawny and unorganized armies, with inefficient bureaucracies, with economies destroyed by war.[19] As they were changing during the first wave of globalization (circa 1870-1920) and they confronted strong opposition in the regions they were forced to construct new international diplomatic and trade networks, especially with those countries that "mattered". While building the nation, they had to improve their image in the eyes of an increasingly demanding international context that, for some good reasons, perceived them as corrupt and far from modern. Not to mention the "accommodation" of different ethnicities, identities, and cultures into the one state one nation mold. Their final success was relative; they left a legacy of

[19] When the modern state emerged in Latin America, it inherited devastated post-war economies. It could be argued that until the early decades of the twentieth century none of the newly formed states possessed a fully functioning economy, or the capacity to develop a sound taxation system or efficiently penetrate the regions. See Centeno, Miguel Angel Blood and Debt: War and the Nation State in Latin America. The Pennsylvania University Press, 2002. See as well Fernando Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1800-1900, Duke University Press, 2000. Many of these weaknesses have continued to characterize these states up until the present time.

instability that is still with us today. And yet they were operating under very definite ideas of modernity that shaped both state and nation.

My point is that in Latin America the construction of the modern nation-state faced a number of domestic and international pressures that state makers in Western Europe or in the United States did not confront.[20] Nowhere else, perhaps with the exception of the First Republic --although some have argued that in the US *the nation* preceded *the state*—can we find a clearer picture of the modern state and nation rising almost *at the same time*.[21] In part, the picture we have painted brings us to what takes place in the region during the second wave of globalization, especially in terms of state reform and the redefinition of the nation and national identity. The regions' capacity for absorbing modern international standards, a legacy of the first wave of globalization, has become a constant over time.[22] This capacity, however, should not be confused with a mere imitation of modernity created elsewhere.

Industrialization, which Latin America lacked and Europe and the U.S. possessed, is not, in isolation, a good indicator of modernity. In Europe, industrialization transformed and modernized society at many different levels. Yet many stubborn aristocratic and centralizing institutions persisted, not to mention imperial ambitions which were,

[20] We will discuss the major differences between modernity in the US and Latin America shortly below.

[21] Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 1992

[22] In the 1990s, external factors combined with domestic ones as strongly as they did in the first wave. Again at that time the region enthusiastically adopted international standards (neoliberalism, open markets, etc.).

in part, fueled by industrialization, new technologies, and improvements in communications. In the U.S, the industrializing effort did help modernization but it was not fully at work when in the eighteenth century the modern institutions of the first republic were sketched and put to work. Also resembling Europe in the 1600s, Latin American states in the nineteenth century adopted a strategy of agrarian development that included mining and the commercialization of agriculture. It was in this context that its pioneer modern institutions emerged. Latin America remained behind in the industrial race, but this did not stop it from constructing modernity. As we shall see in Part II, the result was not a carbon copy of other Western regions. In the popular imaginary of the new nations the United States took a very important place as a model, but its different economy, society (s) and grand power ambitions made it a difficult example to follow. Europe could not be taken as a serious modern reference either: most countries were monarchical, imperialist, or simple followed aristocratic forms of rule alien to the modern way. Therefore, innovation was needed.

When Argentina celebrated its first centenary, it represented perhaps and unbalanced but novel and advanced experiment in the world of her time.[23] In fact, as early as the 1820s Bernardino Rivadavia in Argentina had introduced advanced political reforms that will have to wait for another two decades to be considered seriously in Europe. President Lopez Pumarejo of Colombia pressed for

[23] See the report by the Argentine Commission of the Panama-Pacific Exposition. 1915. The Argentine Republic. San Francisco: Panama Pacific Exposition

similar reform in the 1850s, before the coffee boom took roots and Barrington Moore's notion of the "commercialization of agriculture" started to make sense. The modern program of the May Revolution in Argentina and the Bolivarian agenda had been the topic of much discussion. The twentieth century added modernity. By 1910, Uruguay embodied an innovative and interesting experiment of social and political engineering. Indeed, by 1917 it had established the first welfare state of the Americas and its Constitution had granted women the right to vote. By the 1910s and 1920s, Colombia, Uruguay, and Chile had achieved party systems that represented, from a liberal standpoint, a cutting edge design. Costa Rica, on its part, had also innovated, transforming a coffee growing valley into a democracy of sorts, already given signs of advanced modernity and liberal standings. Venezuela stood as one of the exceptions. Since the late nineteenth century military dictatorships under Cipriano Castro and Juan Vicente Gomez had stripped the country from its early liberal Bolivarian inspiration. Nevertheless, by the 1940s the country adopted a modern institutional design and political parties started to consolidate. Even under military-caudillo regimes in Venezuela the one state-one nation model remained as the major guideline of state building. In short, while many ideas about the nation and state building were imported from Europe and North America, their implementation and the resulting institutions stood on their own as novel and different. We can conclude, therefore, that in nineteenth century Latin America the nation-state –in close connection with the construction of national identity and the nation-- stood as pioneer modern products.

Futures and Nations

“Discuss it, Planchet, out of discussion is born light.’
‘Well, then, since I have monsieur’s permission, I will tell him that, in the first place, there is the Parliament.’
‘And next?’ Said D’ Artagnan.
‘The Army’
‘Why, do you see anything else?’’
‘Why, then the nation! Said Planchet.

‘Is that all?’ Said D’Artagnan

‘The nation which consented to the overthrow and death of the late King…and which will not be willing to disown its actions.’ Said Planchet.

‘Planchet” said D’Artagnan, you argue like a cheese! The nation, the nation is tired of these gentlemen who give themselves such barbarous names, and who sing songs to it. Singing for singing’s sake, my dear Planchet. I have remarked that nations prefer singing marrying tunes to the plain chant.” *

*Conversation between D’Artagnan and Planchet, from Alexander Dumas’ The Vicomte de Bragelonne, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 148

Nation and state stood side by side in the complex liberal imaginary of nineteenth century Latin America. As D’Artagnan say, however, state and nation can be perceived not only as distinct but also as divorcing and clashing forces. Dumas wrote in the nineteenth century, a time in which modern institutions of government were publicly and freely discussed. Conceptions of the nation varied; it could represent the popular will or betray it, it could oppose the state or it could support established governments. In the Americas, but more energetically Europe and especially in France and Germany,

the relation between the nation and the state was many times perceived as incompatible. Government, for instance, was many times accused of “betraying the nation”. Other times, people regarded the state as anti-national and unpatriotic. The state can also be conceived as an empty box without its nation.

Like it has often happened in Latin America, the responsibility for the mistakes made by the state or the ups and downs of the economy etc. were often blamed either on “the nation” or on external powers. In Latin America the nation took, as it did in France, the character of an independent actor with a life of its own. Like in D’Artagnan’s suggestion, it was very often demagogically equated with *the people*. For many who defended a populist notion of the nation this was encouraging, because it made the nation more sensitive to the plea of its own children. The nation was expected to respond to the needs of the many, and governments actually often called upon it to save the country. It could, as Dumas argued, also be insensitive because, like the people, the nation could be manipulated. While the nation could be an instrument of opposition against those “gentlemen” who abused their power, it also seemed to respond sometimes too much to those who would sing the happy “tune” that it wanted to hear.

Modernity, however, meant that state and nation were conceived as tied to one another. The one state-many nation model appeared more unstable but as the twentieth century advanced in Latin America, especially in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Mexico, the nation achieved almost a higher status than the state and the balance between the one state-one nation

model appeared to be broken. Loyalty to one seemed not to mean loyalty to the other, especially as the state was equated with government and politicians. Early enough in the century the leaders of the Mexican Revolution publicly expressed this tension: revolting against the state did not mean to revolt against the nation. Most groups fighting the state, in fact, claimed to do it in the name of the nation. In the 1930s and 1940s the rise of populism in many Latin American countries attempted again to glue together the state and the nation. Excluded popular sectors or powerful grass roots organizations that had worked outside the sphere of the state (unions, interest groups, peasant and workers' rural cooperatives, and indigenous communities) were incorporated into government, reconstructing ruling coalitions and redefining the nation. The military were also part of these coalitions. Tensions seemed to subside during the Cold War era and, as mentioned, have emerged again under different guidelines in the twentieth first century. Yet the one state-one nation model still prevails

In Latin America, these tensions between the nation and the state within the one state-one nation model, provided government with a valuable tool. It could elaborate a discourse of future hope for the nation without fully taken the responsibility to deliver. "Enemies of the nation" could at times ruin these plans for the future of the nation and the nation, in abstract, seemed the only entity capable to decide its own future. The state could only help. External powers could also act against the nation and government needed to defend it more often than not under the banner of nationalism, thus deviations from original commitments about building a better future for the nation

were justified. In short, the future of the nation seemed to be more in the nation's hands than in those of the state.

In the imaginary of the nation that spanned the mid nineteenth century toward the beginning of the Cold War and beyond, elites and the citizenry alike conceived the nation as usually rich, generous, wealthy, and, especially, the master of incredible vast and never-ending natural resources. A strong association with geography, territory, and land, emerged from the very beginning, challenging some literature that has strongly argued that nation, country, and territory are very different and separate things.[24] This was so because the nation was conceived as a wealth of natural resources and, like the land, a giver. No matter what, the nation never ceased to provide and the future never ceased to represent an open promise to all members of the national community. Yet, there was no sense of mission or predetermination. Promising futures but lurking uncertainty; a generous nation with endless resources that could continuously give but "men" and institutions (politicians, enemies of the nation, multinational corporations, foreign powers, foreign capital, banks, government) could always emerged and take away too much for themselves and betray other nationals. The future of the nation was promising and wealthy, but cycles of uncertainty could make that promise vanish. Apparently, not everybody participated in the promising future of the nation, neither in practice nor in theory. Excluded groups were not part of this nation where the future continuously promised although reality many times denied that

[24] See this discussion, for instance, in Luckacs, John. Democracy and Populism: Fear and Hatred. New Heaven, Yale University Press, 2005

promise. Most indigenous people, the very poor, the excluded and marginalized and so fourth, did not participate in that future hence did not identify with the nation. As much as the past, futures created that "emotional sentiment" needed to tie members to a nation. That was the predominant image of the nation for modern Latin America.

Latin American nation-states provide examples of "civic nationalism", that is, the idea that all people who live within a given territory dominated by a state can be part of the nation, regardless of their ethnicity, culture, or religion. Obviously nation building in North, Central, and South America offers plenty of examples of exclusion and/or limited citizenship. Yet, like France and the United States, the founding notion remained that of voluntary membership and mechanisms of exclusion were created on the basis of this model. Images of the future of the nation acted as a powerful incentive to attract membership. E. Hobsbawam has long argued that many tools are available in order to construct the nation.[25] Latin America adds a very important one: '*imagining' the future of the nation in order to create a sense of belonging to a common projec*t. The objective was to capture members' expectations about their individual futures and make them a part of a shared project. Unlike Europe, this tool took, in Latin America, a central role in nation building. Unlike the United States, this "future" lacked a sense of mission and it was not bound by religiosity. Therefore, unlike any other place in the nineteenth and

[25] Hobsbawam, Eric J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge, University Press, 1990; and "Inventing Tradition" in Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp 1-14. See as well his The Age of Empire, 1875-1914, New York, Vintage Books, 1989

early twentieth century, but like many places in the twenty first, this became part of 'imagining the nation' --just to revert to Benedict Anderson's phrasing. Both elites and the state used images of the future as tools to build a modern construct upon which to materialize national identity. We find evidence that elites were not alone: immigrants and the lower classes did likewise. Therefore, of all the "ingredients", as Barrington Moore called them, that states have at their disposal to construct the nation and national identity, in Latin America images of its possible "futures" ranked paramount.[26]

This goes against most established literature. The complexities of defining the nation become apparent in the long and often quoted list of factors examined by Ernest Renan in the nineteenth century. By the time the new republics of Latin America were still trying to construct their nation-states Renan delivered a conference in Paris that has influenced most literature ever since.[27] After surveying his world and identifying the different factors that one would need to arrive to a definition of the nation, Renan discarded most of them. His list included language, ethnicity, culture, and a common history. Not satisfied with any of these tools, Renan claimed that "A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle". Such "principle", however, rested upon a rich "common heritage and memories" and an actual "agreement

[26] Fernando Lopez-Alves, "Nations and Futures: Latin America and Europe during the Fist Wave of Globalization", paper presented at the American Sociological Association, Boston, 2008

[27] See Ernest Renan's well known essay, "What is a Nation?" in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (ed.) Becoming National, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp 41-55.

…and the desire to live together".[28] Thus while Renan was dubious about the weight of the past in constructing the nation he certainly thought that it was much more important than other factors. Most literature after him has continued to think likewise or made the past and historical experiences the most powerful variable. For Renan, and for many others, the "love of the nation" is basically spontaneous and, in a sense, voluntary, because it emerges naturally among the members of a given community that shared a history. National consciousness, in other words, is rooted back into the past. In addition, he and others have long claimed that this spontaneous "national sentiment" cannot be produced by governmental craftsmanship. For Renan, thus, nations constitute the natural baseline of any political organization and they cannot be artificially created.[29]

As can be seen given the previous discussion, the experience of modern Latin America with nation building challenges these 'classic' claims. To start, the past was not as important a tool as the promises of the future. Second, while the past provided an important tool to build national identity (hence the construction of national history) it did not suffice. The future proved much more useful and less compromising. Third, this argument underestimated the role of the state. While one cannot argue with absolute certainty that in Latin America the state completely and entirely created the nation, one can

[28] Renan, op. cit. p 153.

[29] This is basically is the conclusion of the French theologian in his famous 1882 Sorbonne lecture , "What is a Nation?" op. cit. pp 41-55.

detect powerful mechanisms by which the state crafted the nation and created national sentiment.

One needs to remember that these states were weak.[30] A particularity of Latin America was the simultaneity of state and nation building, which poses intriguing questions about state capacity. The strong role of the state in nation building is not exclusive of Latin America. Other regions of the world come to mind: Africa in the 1960s and 1970s; Central Asia and parts of Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Yet Latin America remains a pioneer in terms of the simultaneity of state and nation building and in having built both under intense globalization. In addition, globalization coincided with a strong push for modernization.

I do not claim that the "heavy weight" of the past is not crucial. A shared history can contribute to construct the emotional ties that bond members with their nation. National histories, flags, shared traumatizing experiences and so forth reinforce and create national sentiment. I argue, however, that this did not suffice. The new republics required a new foundation. Their national histories had to be written, and they were. However, images of a common future in the conceptualization of the nation made it possible to make those foundations more credible and people to identify with the state and the emerging "nation".

As much as for Renan for Max Weber history explained national sentiment. He was puzzled by the complexities and ambiguities of the term nation: "it certainly cannot be stated in terms

[30] Most literature agrees that these states were comparatively weak. See Centeno, Miguel Angel, op. cit. and Lopez-Alves, Fernando, op. cit.

of empirical qualities common to those who count as members of the nation,… (because)… the reasons for the belief that one represents a nation vary greatly".[31] For Weber, requirements for membership depended on context. And for him that context revealed the importance of a shared past. My argument is that that context in which the nation is constructed also includes both images of what the future of the nation would look like, and how that future could come about. Different past experiences could explain dissimilar kinds of membership and variations in the conceptualization of the nation. Yet images of the future of the nation also explain membership. It strongly contributed to that sense of attachment that all literature agrees is central to construct national identity.

Anthony Smith, who has written profusely on nationalism, also argues for the importance of history. The nation, he writes "is a named historical population occupying a historical territory and sharing common myths and memories, a public culture, and common laws and customs for all members". [32] Smith does not completely discard the construction of the future as part of the definition of the nation. He includes the idea of *national destiny* for instance, as part of his understanding of the nation. "The nation, in the eyes of nationalists, can be described as a community of history and destiny, or better, a community in which history requires and produces

[31] Max Weber quoted in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds). From Max Weber, London, Routledge, 1970, p. 174

[32] See, among other writings, his "History and National Destiny: Responses and Clarifications", in Nations and Nationalism, 10, 2, pp 95-209.

destiny. This idea of *destiny* carries much more emotional freight than notions of the future"[33]

Our argument differs from Smith's in that he stresses the idea of destiny, and we underline the idea of future. He is right that the idea of destiny can be powerful. It is also consistent with his argument because destinies are usually predetermined by a glorious past. This, Latin America did not have; the national histories that were written logically glorified the heroes of independence, the "people", intellectuals, and nation builders. Yet, it was too recent a past and could not be used with the same weight and rooted consciousness as it could in Europe. Unlike "density", the meaning of "future" contains no predetermination. Destinies and pasts are usually glorious; futures are open and most of the times uncertain. In connection to the idea of destiny, a golden past, as Smith puts it, will finally "shine forth once again".[34] Latin America shows that nations that can claim no golden past (either real or fabricated) make the future shine even more.

Open futures and a strong sense of hierarchy can coexist in definitions of the nation. Latin America is an example. One does not find, for instance, "horizontal camaraderie", as defined by Benedict Anderson's and many others. For Anderson, a nation is "an imagined political community –and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest

[33] Smith, Nationalism, op. cit. p. 30.

[34] Smith, ibid. p 31.

nations will never know most of its fellow members, meet them, or even herd of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their community". [35] In Latin America, however, these nations developed as status conscious and class oriented. The state enforced mechanisms of inclusion and promoted particular images of the nation while attacking others. Like in the United States, race remained an unresolved issue although different mechanisms of exclusion were used. As is well known, Native Americans as well as Africans and its descendents and poor Creoles did not participate in decision-making or did under severe restrictions. The "emotional attachment" uniting members to the nation was, therefore, very different depending on what class, race, status, or ethnicity people happened to belong. For the most part, the resulting nations represented a construct where horizontal lines of camaraderie were blurred but those of hierarchy and status stood firm.

Ideas of open futures as part of national identity places Latin America closer to the United States than to Europe. Yet, Latin America inaugurates a different modern way to use "the future" in nation building and, as we shall see, did it in a way very different from that of the United States. Like is also the case today with many regions of the world that are constructing national identity under global pressures, international factors played an enormous role in shaping the region's national identity. Indeed, global influences were

[35] Anderson, Benedict R. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983, and Under Three Flags: Anarchism and Anti-Colonial Imagination. London. Verso. 2005.

a part of the different conceptions of the future that forged the nation...

One of the findings of the twentieth first century is that global change and the nation-state are intimately connected. This, Latin America had discovered long ago. A second finding is that national identity appears to be linked to globalization. Again a discovery that Latin American republics made roughly 140 years ago during the 50 year period that spanned from the 1870s to the early 1930s. National identity has either being considered and anti-globalization trench from which to defend what is "ours" or a dying entity that progressively looses "the national" under the overwhelming power of a growing "global culture" or "foreign influence". These images, as we have seen, have been shaped by modernization and globalization literature. These claims are not news for Latin America either but, more importantly, they are not based on solid evidence.

Arguments about the death of national identity are similar to what we heard about the withering of the state. Nations have been seeing as melancholic memories of a not so golden past.[36] In fact, the vanquishing of nationalism and the weakening of national identity seemed, for some, accomplished. In 1999, for example, Ross Poole predicted that "the conditions which have sustained nationalism are themselves undergoing transformations and that, it is now possible to

[36] See, for instance, Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy…this view is also implicit in rosy versions of globalization, such as Freedman, Thomas, The World is Flat

envisage –however tentatively—the end of nationalism."[37] Weaker states and growing global markets could not sustain nationalism.[38] Globalization, thus, has been viewed as a destroyer of national identity. We have however known other destroyers before. Both World Wars were supposed to weaken (and some argued erase) nationalism and identity. Because ethnic nationalism lay at the roots of both the Great and the Second World War the world that followed was supposed to be one free from the clashing of nationalities and the "paranoia" of nationalism. Did not Europe create the EU, in part, to avoid further clashes of nationalities? National identity, however, is strong and thriving. Latin America has long shown that rather than eliminating each other globalization and national identity melted into a modern construct that imported what was "foreign" and treated it as if it were "ours". Three of the big actors of today's global scenario were present: globalization, changing national identities, and immigration.[39] At present, Latin America continuous to show that also under the second wave of globalization national identity can absorb foreign influence and incorporate it into the nation.

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[37] Poole, Ross, Nation and Identity, London, Routledge, 1999, p.5 Indeed, in his last chapter, Poole describes what he calls "the end of the affair", based on the notion that the variables that, according to him, had created and feed nationalism, were further fading away and loosing power.

[38] Ibid, p. 46. His argument is more complex: together with changes in state structures, from stronger to weaker, he lists "market relationships" that are now "more massively and visibly global than ever before" therefore weakening the nation state. "The traditional nationalist idea of self-sufficiency has become an obvious illusion". The problem with this argument is that the nation as a community and nationalism as a movement or ideology go beyond and are richer than the idea of self-sufficiency.

[39] As is well known, Europeans and other immigrants arrived in waves during mid and late 1800s and early 1900s. In Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile foreign influence was enormous; in Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru considerable, and everywhere in the region important.

Modernization and Globalizations

Modernization and globalization are distinct phenomena and have generated two separate literatures. Both of them have provided macro frameworks of analysis and theories of international change. In terms of the nation, nationalism, and national identity, they have contributed implicit --and explicit-- frameworks that we have used to explain different conceptions of the nation both in core and periphery, not to mention the collective action of nationalism. Their valuable contribution to our understanding of the nation-state has been noted. Unfortunately, for the most part these theories have not been a part of growing literature on the nation, nationalism, and national identity, especially when it comes to the study of Latin America. Theories of modernity, in fact, seemed to have been either forgotten or not useful in this literature. And when literature on the nation includes the international context does so under the powerful momentum of theories of globalization. Yet for all the importance of globalization theory much work on nation building or national identity in Latin America does not include comparative macro analysis. Indeed, comparative approaches to the nation and national identity have been more the exception than the rule, leaving a theoretical vacuum that needs to be filled in order to obtain a more accurate “big picture”. My claim, however, is that our understanding of the nation is incomplete if international factors are not included. Indeed they are a crucial “ingredient” in the construction of national identity and what is “ours”.

Despite obvious differences, theories of modernization and globalization have favored similar lines of causation. Modernization

and globalization are usually argued to flow from the core to the periphery, from the developed regions of the system to the less developed or “underdeveloped”, from the industrialized countries that enjoyed early industrialization to the regions that did not. Literature on national identity and nationalism has been influenced by this model, which has worked against the idea of Latin America as a modernizer.

Modernization initiates usually at the core and, from there, spreads throughout the peripheries. Its main engine has usually rested with the developed, capitalist, western democracies. The process usually provokes “adjustments and reactions” on the less developed. Versions of globalization have painted a similar picture. Like modernization before it, globalization has been argued to accentuate poverty and increase the gap between the rich and the poor, destroy cultures, and vanquish national identities. It has also been attributed positive effects on economy and society since, in the long run, is seen as mitigating the social gap and creating a more equalitarian, fair, and technologically advanced world.[40] Again, causality, for the most part, emanates from the core of the global system in both theories.

Theoretically globalization creates a multi polar integrated world. It is “global” precisely because of interconnectedness and multidirectional causality. And yet we find a different “status” of causality. Very much like the old paradigm of modernization, the less

[40] See, for instance, Friedman, Thomas The Word is Flat, and also his The Lexus and the Olive Tree.

developed regions of the world seem to have lesser influence on the processes. This is especially true of national identities, which appear to change by "reacting" "adjusting" or "resisting" the core's global culture and soft power. Of course India, China, Brazil, and for a long time Russia, are not considered part of the periphery; Japan has traditionally enjoyed a different status as well. In the last decade we have seen a sustained effort on the part of China, India, Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries to bypass Washington and London trying to create a financial and industrial exporting system that would no longer depend upon the older core. One can argue that these countries have, therefore, become an engine of globalization. Yet, does literature seriously see them as "creators" of the global system with a similar status as that of the traditional core? Or is that status still reserved only for the old capitalist heart of the system?[41] This is a very important question for theories of the nation and national identity both in the periphery and core.

As we shall see below, similar to the status assigned to Latin America in modernization literature peripheries are seldom seeing as creating globalization or modernity. Brazil, for instance, the owner of unparalleled natural resources and middle range technology which in combination make the country an important global player, is not really considered a generator of globalization. Neither is Argentina or Mexico, the two other Latin American giants. In the process of

[41] These growing giants do more than generating "bouncing back" effects across the global system. China is the bank of the United States and an industrial power; India a provider of high communications technology that has created an increasingly high technology exporting sector

modernization no Latin American country was thought of generating any authentic modernity. Today, likewise, literature sees the role of Latin American countries in the global system as globalization 'receivers' rather than as globalization 'creators'.[42] When it comes to interpretations of Latin America globalization theory seems to somehow preserve the old causal paradigms of the bipolar world. And with it, it also preserves old assumptions about national identity.

Is this paradigm wrong? In many ways, it is. It has ignored Latin America's role as a modernizer and thus it has missed the region's contribution to the construction of a modern modular form of the nation and of the nation-state which is a fundamental piece in the construction of the modern West. Without revisiting the role of the Iberian and Latin American world in creating modernity, available theories of Modernity, Nationalism, National Identity, Dependency, World Systems, and Globalization remain incomplete. We have known for a long time that, for a number of very good reasons, theories of the global system have taken England, France, Holland, Germany, and, starting in the 18th century, the United States as the big players, makers, and exporters of modernity and globalization. Yet, this picture misses important contributions to the expansion of modernity and globalization that do not rest with the old core. World Systems and Globalization theories has added much complexity to

[42] The "tequila effect" or the Brazilian financial crises of the 1980s and 1990s have been recognized to have dreadful effects on the global system. Those events convinced scholars that causality could go from the periphery to the center. Yet this was interpreted more as problems of adjusting to global circumstances than as really creating global influence. For a discussion on the distinction between "Globalization Receivers" and "Globalization Creators", see the Introduction in Diane Johnson and Fernando Lopez-Alves, ed. Globalization and Uncertainty in Latin America, McMillan, 2007.

this picture but still the chain of causality remains, at bottom, similar. The addition of new runner ups to global dominance (China, India) or the recycling of older powers (Russia, Japan) contributed more complex --and realistic-- causal networks. My claim is that this is still not enough to adequately explain the nation, national identities, and the nation-state. As it has at times softly argued it is not enough either to account for institutions that for a long time we have portrait as side effects of changes occurring at the core. High levels of capitalist development, cutting edge technology, higher levels of industrial production, and financial sophisticated networks are sufficient but not necessary conditions to become a modernizer. A similar argument can be made about what makes a region of the world either a “globalizer” or a recipient of globalization.

In Modernization Theory Latin America and other areas would represent a sort of “*Distorted Modernity*” which grew out of a background of colonialism, dependence, low industrial development and, also for many authors, a “traditional” set of values and mores that tended to slow down modernization. This perception has found echo in much globalization theory today. Partly as a consequence, we still find ambiguity in literature on Latin America as to where the Iberian-Latin American world really belongs. Is it traditional or modern? Is it Western or non-Western? Does it represent a sort of category in between? All these questions reflect on the way literature has studied national identity and nation making in the region.

Figure 1 represents the image that emerges when one surveys well-known theories that have studied Latin America and placed it in an international context. As can be seen, Latin America is mostly pictured as “reacting” and “adopting” modern influences from other countries, regions, or even financial institutions. Vectors coming from these actors shape Latin America while vectors of influence coming from the region toward international actors seem to have little impact except when, as we shall see, one talks about “culture”.

Figure 1 about here.

Modernization and Latin America



To sum up, nation building under the one state one nation formula was a key part of modernization and the consolidation of modern forms of national identity world wide. Perhaps more than any other regions in "the periphery" Latin America has contributed to the global consolidation of modernity in three connected ways:

1) The pioneer construction of models of the *nation* and *national identity* that question today's accepted wisdom: the use of "open futures" as a tool of nation building.
2) The simultaneous construction of *the state* and *the nation*, two related but different phenomenon. Such simultaneity in the case of Latin America compels comparison and contributes to a needed theory of the nation-state in the sense pointed out above. What comes first, the state or the nation? In Europe, the nation sometimes came first (Germany). In the United States, it has also been argued that the nation preceded the state. In other parts of Europe (Spain) and in regions of Asia and the Middle East the state consolidated first, the nation followed long after. In other European cases, the debate is still open (France).
3) The construction of the *one state-one nation* model under intense globalization --the so-called 'first wave', circa 1870-1920 and modernization, since this is the time in which the paradigm of modernization stood as a model worldwide. The nation-state and national identity, thus, emerged in a context characterized by modernization, the erosion of hegemonies and the consolidation of new world powers, not to mention

> the emergence and redefinition of social classes, conflict, and culture, worldwide. A situation that facilitates the identification of causal linkages between domestic and international factors in connection with the nation and national identity. Sizeable parts of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East formed nation-states at a later time and under different international circumstances not necessarily marked by globalization. Thus, global influence on national identity finds a crucial comparative and pioneer example in Latin America. A useful comparative instance when one thinks of similar processes that took place in Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, Central and Southeast Asia and parts of the Middle East during the late twentieth century, under the so-called second wave of globalization.

Again, a crucial question of this first decade of the twentieth first century is whether we are witnessing the melting of 'the modern' glue that since the nineteenth holds state and nation together. Can a new model emerge? Would the recent policies of some Latin American countries continue to challenge this model, as in Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela, or Peru, not to mention ubiquitous European tensions between the central state and "autonomous" regions (Spain, Italy, England, Russia)?. As happened during the first wave, globalization both exerts pressures over national identity everywhere and leads to a resurgence of its importance, too. Theories about the death of the state under the sweeping winds of globalization (and particularly neo-liberalism) never held any real substance. Instead,

however, one can argue that today's globalization plays against the modern link between state and nation forged during the first wave. We have made this argument elsewhere.[43] Recent (2009) surveys in Latin America show that the notion of "the nation" as an indivisible unit is weakening, and that about 36 to 39% of those interviewed do not know how to define their nations.[44] Will this trend take us back to pre-modern times? Or to a different future where none of these categories are adequate? Before we go back to our argument about globalization, futures, and nations, a brief detour is needed.

Chapter I:

IMAGES AND FUTURES OF THE LATIN AMERICAN NATION

Where Does Latin America Belong?

Confusion about the role of the Iberian/Latin American world in modernization processes and its capacity to create modernity finds roots in a conception of a modern West which, for much literature, is the exclusive product of American, French, and British legacies. Anglo-North American liberal thinking offers a wealth of philosophical

[43] See the recent study by Fernando Lopez-Alves and Raul Aragon, "La Nacion en la Urbe Post-Neo Liberal" paper presented at the Conference "Globalizacion and Identidades Nacionales," Universidad Catolica del Uruguay" Montevideo, Uruguay, September 30th, 2009.

[44] Fernando Lopez-Alves and Raul Aragon, The Divorce between Citizens and the State in Latin America" work in progress. Surveys in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile included 1200 cases each, and were financed by PICTO grant in conjunction with the UAI in Buenos Aires.

and theoretical thinking regarding theories of government, the rights of men, democracy, development, and social equality. What other regions of the world and other societies have contributed to transform, add, re-create, shape, and put in practice the basic principles of modernity, however, has been scarcely studied. The Iberian/Latin American tradition, for instance, has also a contribution to make to both the theory and practice of modernization. As Juan Marichal has forcefully argued, since the sixteenth century Spain produced a clear, strong, and forceful notion of ¨liberty" and liberalism that has gone unobserved.[45]

French scholarly work, like the British-North American literature, has for the most part portrait Latin America as a recipient of modernity. French philosophers viewed Spain as a country with no enlightened traditions and therefore one that could make no contribution to modern thinking. In 1721 Montesquieu argued along these lines, describing Spain and the Iberian tradition as "incapable" of generating modern values and ideas. Whether Montesquieu was right or wrong about his view of Spain in the 1720s is a point of debate. What it is known, however, is that a few decades after, and contrary to these arguments, Spain was playing an important role in the enlightenment.[46]

[45] Juan Marichal, El Secreto de Espana: Ensayos de historia intelectual y politica, Santillana, Taurus, 1995

[46] Juan Marichal, op. cit 1995, pp 15-28

Centuries after, similar misperceptions about Latin America still prevail. No one denies that the area presents a number of "modern" features but it continues to be represented as a beneficiary of modern ideas created somewhere else.[47] Similar to Anglo-American literature that we will examine below and studies produced in Latin America, a quasi romantic view of the Latin American condition finds its place in French writings on Latin America.[48] Like much other literature, it has praised "cultures", music, literature, art, collective action, grass roots organization, and lifestyles.

Historically and socially, Latin America has been acknowledged to represent one of the most enthralling social and political experiences of the modern world. We have a wealth of data and studies focusing on the region. The great first encounter of Europeans with Native American civilizations, the inevitable slavery and subjugation of its indigenous peoples, the clash of these civilizations, the allure and horrors of the conquest, etc. have fascinated scholars. Much has been written about the social structure and advanced technology of its ancient civilizations, its economic dependence, its privilege natural resources, its incessant turbulent political, ethnic, and social conflicts, its political systems and

[47] The prevalent image that emerges is that of an imperfect expression of the ideas of the French Revolution and Liberalism which provides the foundation for regimes prone to conflict, military intervention, or revolution.

[48] The well-known and many times cited work of Regis Debary on Latin America, for instance, can, for the most part, be placed within this tradition, although Debray stands out in this tradition as a very pragmatically oriented writer. See his Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America, **:** Monthly Review Press, 1967

institutions. In addition, most work on the region has registered the impact of several globalizations, starting with that of the sixteenth century and that created colonialism. Latin America connects with at least five empires (Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British and, of course, the US, if we were to consider this last country as such).[49] No question that all these aspects of Latin America are more than enough to place it among one of the most absorbing social and political laboratories of our world. Still, other regions can make similar claims on many of these counts. As we argued, however, the region has distinctive claims to make.

Globalization as a conceptual construct is still an ongoing debate that obviously goes beyond liberalism or neo-liberalism -- although in Latin America these two different meanings have, in practice, been identified as one. What one can for sure say is that no region or country in the world could claim to represent the utmost archetypical "globalized" society. No such an archetype exists, whether in the debate or in practice. Is Spain less or more globalized than the United States, Britain, China, or Germany? It all depends on parameters that are still a work in progress. Regarding the debate on "modernity", the core has long claimed it. Yet under closer inspection no region or country in the core has fully incarnated the paradigm either. Neither the United States nor Britain or France, the archetypes of modernity in the literature, can be considered totally "modern". Surely all would depend on degrees of modernity rather

[49] For a discussion of the US as an Empire and its connections with Latin America, see F. Lopez-Alves and Daniel Dessein (ed.) , Siete Escenarios para el Siglo XXI, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 2004, pp 13-51

than on absolutes. Nevertheless, how would countries at the core rank if compared with one another? Which would be the no.1 modern country? This is an exercise that Modernization Theory never attempted. Rather, it focused more on ranking the peripheries, task that continued under more sophisticated paradigms by World System Theory.

Latin America has been viewed as a sort of a sort of "*distorted modernity*".[50] Both work from the Left or the Right of the political spectrum have, on this point, coincided. Literature has traditionally divided Latin America into regions, and assigned different degrees of "modernity" to each; all of it, however, was interpreted taken as a number of cases of distorted modernity. Argentina, Uruguay, and in part Chile have, according to accepted wisdom, represent more "western and European" versions, lands of recent settlement, etc., while others such as Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay or Ecuador much less so. Colombia and Venezuela, together with some Central American countries like Panama or Dominican Republic have been considered groups of their own, divided by visible differences in terms of degrees of development. Mexico has often been perceived as a "special", at times even called "unique", case of modernity, and so forth.

Among Latin American intellectuals "distorted modernity" became appealing.[51] "Distortions" have been praised as something

[50] For a full discussion of this literature see below in part II of this book.

[51] This point has been made many times. See, for instance, Jose Mauricio Domingues, La Modernidad Contemporanea en Latin America, Siglo XXI, 2009, p. 11

positive. Precisely because of underdevelopment and inequality, it has been claimed, the area has engaged in active protest and collective action, boasting one of the highest records of social mobilization in the world. Today, the region has been perceived as the forefront of revolution, anti-globalization, and anti-neo-liberal doctrine.[52] Nevertheless, instability and revolutionary collective action can represent modernity itself, which by its very nature has triggered revolution and conflict in both core and periphery.

It seems redundant to say that Latin America belongs to the modern West. No serious argument to the contrary, in fact, has been put forward. And yet some ambiguity in the literature does exist. According to the North American Conservative Right, the region has for a long time been considered not truly "modern" or even "Western". In the mid 1980s Jean Kirkpatrick, the US representative to the United Nations, often argued that this vast area belonged to the West but only geographically. It really lay outside the West socially, politically, and economically. It has also been said that Latin America continues to represent "traditional" values that are somewhat similar to Western values but not really western.[53] In addition, the division

[52] Perry Anderson, for instance, has fairly recently made this argument in New Left Review, although expressed in very different terms. New Left Review, Fall issue, 2008, pp 7-10. See Ross Puggia, Globalizations, Neoliberalism, and Capitalism in Latin America, See also the empirically grounded argument made by William Robinson in his Latin America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008

[53] See, for instance, the work of Howard Wiarda, a respected culturalist who has done extensive work on Latin America and who has forcefully argued that Latin America is not really totally "western" in terms of its culture and values. In his edited 1992 volume, other authors contributed as well to this view: Wiarda, Howard J. ed. Politics and Social

between a more “traditional” Latin America and a more “modern” one continues to be confusing. Distinctions address more ideal types than the reality of the region, in which one is really hard pressed to find communities or institutions that could be considered “traditional” or “modern” in the archetypical sense coined by modernization theory during the 1960s. And while to look at the region as revolutionary “distorted” modernity is perhaps more attractive or even romantic it is not accurate.

Modernity, Nation, and “The Masses”

Modernization, David Apter suggested in the late 1960s, is “…a special kind of hope. Embodied within it are all the past revolutions of history and all supreme human desires. The modernization revolution is epic in its scale and moral in its significance. Its consequences may be frightening. Any goal that is so desperately desired creates political power, and this force may not always be used wisely or well.” [54] Apter was of course referring to the revolutionary impact that modernization, as an approach and a practice, had exercised upon social scientists, political leaders, and governments around the world in the 1960s. Yet this description of modernization fully applies to Latin America during the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Change in Latin America: Still a Distinct Tradition? Third edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press

[54] David Apter, The Politics of Modernization. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1965, p 1.

An overwhelming majority of nation makers were modernizers who perfectly knew that their realities were different from those of Europe or the United States. Since the foundation of most of these republics Presidents, public figures, and intellectuals, persistently complained about the backwardness of their societies and the need to "modernize" their countries in their own way.[55] In the River Plate, for instance, this has been amply documented.[56] Similar claims can be made about Colombia.[57] Most nationalist discourse in the region, whether coming from civilian or military reformers, the Right or the Left, perceived the modernization of he region as a major goal to be achieved. Their aim, at least as expressed in most public documents, Presidential addresses, and the media of the time, was to create modern nations, tuning up the region to a transforming global environment.[58]

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[55] For a discussion on the position of Latin American state makers and intellectuals with regards to the modernization of their countries, see Fernando Lopez-Alves, "*Between the Economy and the Polity in the River Plate*", monograph, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1994.

[56] In the case of Argentina during the period of state formation, for instance, Tulio Halperín Donghi has forcefully argued this point. See, especially, his Revolución y guerra; formación de una elite dirigente en la Argentina criolla. 1972, Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI. See also Politics, Economics and Society in Argentina in the Revolutionary Period. 1975, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. See, especially, his Proyecto y construcción de una nación: Argentina 1846–1880. Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1980

[57] For a full discussion and references, see the chapter on Colombian state making (chapter three) in Fernando Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810-1900, Duke University Press, 2000

[58] For an examination of these documents see Fernando Lopez-Alves, "Nations, States, and Futures, in Latin America: 1864-1930" paper presented at the ASA Conference, August 2008, Boston.

While one can claim that many African, Asian and Middle Eastern leaders and institution makers have also been fascinated by creating modern nation-states and that they also wanted to link their countries to a rapidly changing global system, these regions did differed from Latin America in that they did not go through a similar processes of globalization and modernity. Modernizers in Latin America acted as if they had no other choice but creating nations that followed what they thought of as modern precepts and paradigms. From the standpoint of nation makers on the ground, Francis Fukuyama's argument of "the end of history" could apply. Indeed, ruling elites that emerged from independence considered that republican rule, some sort of democracy, and a nation forged upon the "right values" (that is, modern values) represented their only available alternative. As elsewhere, modernization implied a better future. In Latin America, as argued, images of the future were included into the conceptualization of the nation.

We possess a wealth of archival work, especially correspondence between immigrants in Latin America and their relatives and friends in Europe, attesting to their hopes for a better future.[59] We know that, unlike in the United States or Europe today, where most immigrants have little influence in affairs of state, in Latin America the opposite was the case. Mutual aid societies, pressure groups, employers' associations, owners associations involving industry and, at times, land, were organized, founded, and managed

[59] See, for instance, Jose C. Moya, Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires 1850-1930, University of California Press, 1998, pp 13-44

by foreigners who tried to impose their views on government. This was true not only of countries with large European immigrant populations, as Argentina and Uruguay, but also of Peru, Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Bolivia, Colombia, and especially Venezuela. As we shall see in Part II, the mythical trust in the wealth of the new nations and their potential lay at the bottom of these expectations. Creoles were hopeful about the future of their nations as well. Presidential addresses, for instance, did not fail to describe the nation through its bright future and thus a better future for the members of the nation. Who were members of the new nations? Who did states want to recruit into the nation?

Modernization requires the incorporation of new comers into the political scene, usually excluded sectors of the lower classes. In Latin America, the nation was conceptualized at a time in which some massive inclusion could not be avoided. Unlike Europe, from the onset the region had to cope with pressures from “the masses”. An important global event that shaped nation building from the start was the advent of a world of “consumers”, a part of the first wave of globalization. This “incorporation’” of the masses into the conceptualization of the nation was done at a different timing and in a different from the United States as well. Nations in Latin America emerged in a world where consumers’ preferences as well as the “masses” had started to shape both markets and industry. As the Latin American nation-state was consolidating the “masses” became a political and economic actor. Jose Ortega y Gasset’s argument in The Revolt of the Masses seems pertinent here. Describing the late

nineteenth century's incorporation of "the masses" into politics, he wrote: "this is the time of the people because they now are the ultimate source of legitimacy". [60] After the French revolution, the crowd was perceived as an anarchic violent populace topping law, tradition, and order. Progressives and many liberals saw it differently: the masses represented the glorious armies of proletariat and socialists defending self determination and progress. Thus, urban crowds either became the most dangerous manifestations of modern life or the premonition of a future full of promise and inspiration.

These crowds were apparently present in urban centers in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia. By the end of the nineteenth century also Rio de Janeiro saw the threatening masses of liberated slaves and immigrants rapidly grow. Given their early high degrees of urbanization Buenos Aires and Montevideo, more than any other Latin American cities witnessed with apprehension what they perceived as a threat that paralleled that of the unruly crowds of Europe. The conceptualization of the nation would include these "masses" in both the role of consumers and immigrants. The "other", therefore, became a part of the context from which the state drew its nation-making tools.

In other words, unlike Europe and to an extent like the United States, from the onset of the process of nation building and the forging of national identity Latin America was forced to deal with important issues of political rights, inclusion, and race relations.

[60] Ortega y Gasset, Jose. The Revolt of the Masses, Norton & Company, 1932, p 23

States had no choice but to “accommodate the masses” in a modern sense, both in social life and as part of the desired nation. Of course in response to upper class pressures government crafted institutional mechanisms to keep part of the masses at bay. Selected sectors of the lower classes were integrated in a way that would not upset the newly acquired privileged position of those on top. Nevertheless, under republican rule the “masses” could not be completely ignored. Neither could in Europe, but the Old World possessed different and long established mechanisms of integration or exclusion that by the end of the nineteenth century were still adequate and efficient. Monarchical rule, bishoprics, principalities, and other forms of aristocratic rule had long handle pressures from below. In Latin America, old colonial institutions had been destroyed and the new ones had to create a new national identity that accommodated the “aspirations of the masses”.

Like in the United States and Canada or Australia, the masses were racially and culturally mixed. And so was the nation. As is known racial mixing was encouraged as long as nation makers trusted that large waves of European immigrants (Anglos and Germans were most desired) would steadily arrive to their shores and wash away compromising indigenous or African features in the population (Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay; later on Venezuela and Paraguay). Indeed the Argentinean, Uruguayan, Peruvian, and Brazilian states aggressively encouraged European immigration of desired “races”. The state sought to eliminate --or ignore-- racial, cultural, linguistic and ethnic differences to create the desired modern

nation. In Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay, for instance, it attempted to homogenize the nation through the public school system.[61] Argentina and Peru also did so by using universal male conscription into the army. Immigrants and natives alike were "socialized" through military discipline into the cultural, linguistic, and political standards set up by the political elite as a definition of what the nation "ought to be".[62] Some Uruguayan and Colombian political parties attracted large numbers of immigrants as well, acting as instruments of socialization, like the Colorados en Uruguay or the Liberals in Colombia. Nation-states, therefore, wished modern nations, and this could only be done by reconstructing their citizenship racially and socially. Government sought to build legitimacy through national identity but, at the same time, that legitimacy needed to emerge from the "right" national make up. Modernity was discriminatory and white, and states needed to have just one nation. Globalization required modern nations. They followed this model to the last consequences. Brazil has always been considered an example of racial-social engineering regarding the construction of its nation and comparable to South Africa and the South in the United States.[63]

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[61] On Argentina, for instance, see Carlos Escude El Fracaso del Proyecto Argentino: Educacion e ideologia. Buenos Aires, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Editorial Tesis, 1990.

[62] See F. Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, op.cit. chapter 3, and pp 300-304.

[63] See, for instance, Marx, Gregory, Making Race and Nation where he compares nation making with special attention to race relations in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States

Why not to adopt the formula already used by Asia, Europe, parts of the Middle East and Africa? Why not to consider the *one state-many nations* formula? First this alternative spoke of old imperial traditions, regional autonomies, and split identities that were perceived as threats to the newly formed states. Second, the many nations model was regarded as suitable only for large powerful states that could rule over large numbers of people. Third, and most importantly, it also represented non-Republican rule; there were plenty of examples in Europe that showed that Republics were not suited to rule over many nations. Empire and colonialism were also to be avoided by republics that wanted to be modern; besides, no Latin American state had the means to go in that direction. Finally, indigenous as well as African influences were regarded as backwards and pre-modern, thus undeserving the status of "nations". It should be noted that the experience of Latin America with the modern "one state-one nation" model provides one of the few examples in which in a whole region and for more than a century and a half states followed a similar modern paradigm of nation building. Compare this against the records of Africa, Western and Eastern Europe, South East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

Lord Acton's indictment, stemming from his assessment of the British imperial experience, that nations became stronger when possessing different centers of power represented by different nationalities and cultures, was rejected in Latin America. Acton believed that "A state which is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself; a state which labors to neutralize, to absorb or

expel them, destroys it own vitality; a state who does not include them is destitute of the chief basis of self-government."[64] Acton's wisdom, however, sounded not modern enough for Latin America, which stuck to its own archetype of modernity. Only slowly the Latin American nation states acknowledged diversity, and when in the twentieth century they did so, they perceived it as something that needed to be integrated into a larger "national culture".

Not surprisingly strong tensions tended to undermine these nations; it is remarkable in fact that they have lasted as long as they have, and that states have succeeded at repressing alternative conceptions of the nation. Its definition remained at times blurred and tense. Not everybody participated into the collective future of the nation and its promises; those who did not, were marginal to the nation and the political system in general. Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Guatemala, Ecuador, Chile and, despite stronger efforts to the contrary on the part of the state, Mexico, are good examples. Some confusion also arose in countries that perceived themselves as more modern simply because their indigenous and black populations were smaller and their European populations larger like Argentina and Uruguay. Nevertheless, at the end one of the most powerful allures of the nation and the one that attracted most membership remained its promising future. This, despite the many among the poor and the racially discriminated who were for a long time not incorporated as members of the nation.

[64] Quoted in Dahbour, Omar and Ishay, Micheline, The Nationalism Reader, Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1995, p. 117.

Not everybody became a part of its national history either. Nation makers were in desperate need for a glorious national past and history. These republics were too young. Indigenous traditions were perceived as non-modern and therefore not suitable. Observe that nation makers, however, in their need for symbols and traditions, allowed some fragments of the glorious Native American past to become a part of the definition of the nation and the proud emotional attachment of people with their national identity. Paraguay should be treated separate, as an intriguing case of a different type of political system closer in a lot of ways to Eastern Europe than to Latin America.[65] Demographically and culturally Paraguay found itself divided into at least two identities and two nations, although the *Guarani* people, who can certainly qualify as a nation, can be argued not to constitute just one nation but many. Paraguay, however, also adopted the modern model of the nation and for a long time tried mercilessly to enforce it. The incorporation of the "masses", therefore, was done through modern and strict political formulae that respected the indissoluble connection between one state and one particular

[65] Paraguay under Francia represents an exception within South America, since the republican design chosen by Francia and his coalition resembled more a one party or movement system than a liberally inspired model of state building. Also, Francia and his regime were able to relatively quickly subdue regional "caudillos", a process that in other countries took more than a century. The Paraguayan state also centralized power, expand the public sector and intervened in the economy to the point of creating a legal figure that had gone out of fashion since the Roman Empire: publicly owned slaves. Cabanellas, Guillermo. 1946. El dictador del Paraguay, Dr. Francia. Buenos Aires: Claridad. See the interesting work of Pastore, Mario. 1994. "State-Led Industrialism: The Evidence of Paraguay, 1852–1870." Journal of Latin American Studies 26, no. 2 (May):295–324. See also his 1994. "Trade Contraction and Economic Decline: The Paraguayan Economy under Francia, 1810–1840." Journal of Latin American Studies 26, no. 3 (October):539–95

nation that needed to be created. Given this model, it was easy for new notions of political obligation and legitimacy to emerge in connection to International influences that became, as we shall see, a constitutive part of the nation.

Portraits of Latin American Nations:

Modernization, World Systems, Dependency, and Comparative Literature

Similar to the argument that in the 1960s modernization theory took as a banner, nineteenth century modernizers shared the assumption that modernity equaled progress. Indeed, it represented a "natural" path towards it and the right nation was required to achieve it. Socialist thinking and Marxism also praised this benefic side of modernity, but Latin America remained faithful to liberal ideology and capitalism. Already by the 1920s many were critical of modernity, questioning its beneficial effects and the goodness of its intentions. It was found that modern economic development did not always lead to a more fair distribution of wealth or progress. No linear path existed. In many was analogous to what globalization theory suggests today, modernization created conflicts too complex to be quickly, completely, or satisfactorily resolved.[66] Worldwide, modernization meant the displacement or the altogether elimination of many groups or nations. It could represent as Habermas and others have suggested a dissolving force that undermines collective solidarity and encourages alienation and social anomy.

[66] Robinson, William, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony. Harvard, University Press, 2000

These debates, however, were for the most part marginal to most Latin American nation makers. While similar arguments did find an echo among a handful of intellectuals, institution builders and a large part of the intelligentsia continued to equate modernity with progress, a better world, and a platoon from where their societies could be upgraded. Despite much criticism and debate about the meaning of modernization, two notions remained strongly rooted in Latin America. These notions were later recreated by modernization theory and today have been absorbed, in part, by theories of globalization. One is that modernity, progress, and social well-being are intimately connected. A number of globalization scholars do argue that way today.[67] The other is that, for better or for worse, what triggers modernization is the contact between core countries with the rest. Similar claims have been made about globalization.

In 1960s Modernization Theory made this exact argument. It portrait Latin America as a byproduct of modernity created elsewhere. It basically reproduced the early meaning of modernity that nineteenth century state makers had long spelled out and adopted. A "classic" in the field, Cecil Black's work spelled out perhaps better than any other the theory's goals and assumptions. He brought the theory to bear on case studies representing "traditional" societies, a sound comparative effort on modernization that will be followed by

[67] See, for instance, the work of Friedman, Thomas The Word is Flat 2007 and especially, his The Lexus and the Olive Tree

others.[68] Like its nineteenth century predecessors, Daniel Lerner, for instance, saw "traditional" society as something condemned to disappear in the wake of modern rapid change.[69] No wonder modernization scholars found in Latin America a huge geographical area that, in their opinion, represented different "transitions" from "traditional" to "modern" societies.

The theory offered an account of Latin America that installed a strong image for years to come. Dependency Theory was, to a large extent, a response and a critic to Modernization Theory. It argued, among other things, that timing was crucial. Late developers faced very different and disadvantageous circumstances when compared with those countries that had made it into the core of the system. In addition, the dominant structure of power in the international system condemned the underdeveloped periphery to remain such; where modernization saw opportunity dependency saw exploitation and unequal exchange.[70] Capitalist expansion had destined Latin America to be a provider of raw materials and thus "unequal exchange". One can find points of coincidence between the two theories, however, in terms of the way they viewed causality. Causal flows usually went

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[68] Black, Cecil Edwin. The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.

[69] Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society , New York, Macmillan Press 1958

[70] In some dependency theory versions the argument, of course, is more sophisticated, as in Cardoso and Falleto's argument about "dependency situations" rather than "dependency theory" and their analysis of types of export economies and types of dependency. See Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979.

from core to periphery. In terms of national identity and nationalism, Dependency Theory did not have a lot to say, except that the former could be interpreted as part of the periphery's response against "cultural imperialism" and the latter as the result of the core's exploitation of the periphery. Because Dependency Theory's agenda did not include a study of Latin America in terms of its capacity to generate modernity, its modern features were either not noticed or largely interpreted as a result of dependency and the resistance against it.

For Modernization Theory national identity in these traditional societies could not be considered fully "modern". The region, as many others with the exception of the countries that were at the top of the development pyramid, was somehow in "transition" toward a more modern construction of the nation. "Developing" societies had a more modern sense of national identity; less developed societies or those which seem not to move in the development ladder at all, stack with "traditional" forms of conceptualizing their nations and creating national identity. Growing modern, advanced, and "rational" emotional attachment in terms of the ties that unite people to nations was expected. Dependency did not have the same expectations. The nation and national identity remained in a sort of diffuse zone where they did appear to reach neither a total dependent status nor a fully autonomous one. Because Modernization Theory claimed that development –and modernization-- had only been achieved by a few countries in the Western World, modern nations could only exist there. The rest represented different degrees or phases of an

inexorable “developing” process: modern nations and national identity were still in the making.[71] Dependency Theory elaborated responses to a number of these claims. Yet, when it came to the nation and national identity left the floor open for a discussion which never really took place. Revolution and radical structural change, for the theory, represented one of the few possible solutions for countries that wanted to break away from dependency. Theories of revolution had found that drastic revolutionary change was more likely to happen when modern organized actors were at play. But the theory did not really elaborate on the connection between dependency, radical change, and types of national identity or definitions of the nation. Nor, for that matter, did anybody else, except when discussing “culture”, a variable often times confused with national identity.

Unlike Dependency Theory and in agreement with theoretical premises rooted in both ancient and modern interpretations of universal history, Modernization Theory expected that a number of “crises” and “sequences” of “political development” would push some countries lying at the bottom of the modernization ladder near the democracies at the top.[72] Cultural change was supposed to take place as well, although at a slower pace. Culture, which many times included definitions of national identity and that was conceived as an

[71]. See, for instance, the already classic work of Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton, University Press, 1960.

[72] Almond, Gabriel, Flanagan, Scott and Mundt Robert, Crises, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies on Political Development, Boston, Little Brown, 1973. Almond, Gabriel A. and Coleman, James, The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton, University Press, 1960.

overreaching category that included most everything having to do with values, religion, habits, and emotions, was assumed to change slowly. Thus, national identities were also changing at a slow pace, or not changing at all. Because it was assumed that in order to achieve some degree of desired modernity these countries could take as a model the modernizing paths set up by those who had already done so (Western Europe and the United States), one can assume that if modern nations were to emerge in the periphery they would resemble those at the core. Dependency Theory did not really elaborate on this. Nevertheless, once could ask some questions. For instance, if countries were trapped into an international network of power relations that they did not control, were their national identities trapped in conceptions and "emotional attachments" to their nations that they did not control as well?

If economic development was the product of the right values and mores, as Modernization argued, then the right nation would emerge only if values changed. In mid nineteenth century often times quoted argentine President Faustino Sarmiento agreed. The central issue to be resolved by Latin America was the struggle between "civilization and barbarism". Likewise, for modernizers in the 1960s the struggle took place between "traditional and modern" society. The argument is well-known. Could the psychological make up of these people change? Could modernity, prosperity, and modern constructions of the nation and national identity be successfully brought into their societies? The same question could have been posed about Europe but it was asked, instead, of Latin America, the

Middle East, and Africa. Modernization arguments were similar to the ones made later by the social capital literature.[73] The "take off" did not just need savings: it also required an adequate set of morals, attitudes, and standards.[74] Cultural change was possible but its ways remained mysterious.[75] Theories could not really predict its course.[76] Spanish and Indigenous heritages seemed a hindrance and modern nations just a postponed project. In many ways, nineteenth century Latin American modernizers shared the same idea.

In the late 1960s, Samuel Huntington, somewhat a critic of Modernization Theory --although in many ways a "modernist" himself-- published his Political Order in Changing Societies; in it, he placed Latin America in a sort of twilight zone of its own: again, geographically in the West but not really a contributor of westernization. This book, produced at a time in which modernization theory was quite influential, was critical of structural theories of development and democracy. In a nutshell, Huntington argued that

[73] .In a different way but close in meaning the social capital literature that strongly emerged in the 1990s saw, somewhat with the exception of Chile, scarce social capital in Latin America.

[74] The expression is of course taken from the work of Walt W. Rostow. See Rostow, Walt W., The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge University Press, 1990

[75] This can be concluded from one of the most well known modernization classics, Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sydney The Civic Culture, Boston, Little Brown, See also the very good edited volume by the same authors, The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study, Boston: Little, Brown, 1980

[76] Pateman, Carole. 1980. "The Civic Culture: A Philosophical Critique." In The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study, ed. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. Boston: Little, Brown.

structural variables did not suffice. A powerful centralizing government which could lead the process of modernity was needed. Latin America, as Huntington put it, lacked governments that could govern. Thus, strong military rule, in Huntington's argument, could become a modernizing force. Soon we found out the limitation of this argument. What is worth commenting upon, however, is Huntington's persuasive, although distorted, picture of Latin America: a region characterized by frustrated modernity and incapable of generating modern nations.[77]

Other authors using the Modernization Theory paradigm, like Myron Wyner and Joseph La Palombara, reinforced this image of backward nations and "traditional" national identities. Since it was hardly capable of generating modernity of its own, the region seemed eager to adopt modernity but show limited progress.[78] Party building and party competition, strong signs of modernization and democracy for this literature, had spread throughout Latin America. Alex Inkeles and David Smith found that in Latin America and other regions the individual had conquered the centerpiece of social and political life. [79] However, these findings did not fully grant Latin America modern

[77] Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1968. This very interesting book made innovative comparative arguments and it was, in fact, used in Political Science departments as required reading in Comparative Politics training. In terms of Latin America, however, Huntington for the most part used scattered and inaccurate data. More was assumed than proven.

[78] Joseph LaPalombara & Weiner, Myron (Editors) Political Parties and Political Development, Apter, David, Political Change, Frank Cass & Co, 1973, and especially his The Politics of Modernization

[79] Inkeles, Alex, and David H. Smith. Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974

status. Mainly because the engine of modernization rested elsewhere, national identity –and, we can assume, conceptualizations of the nation—could not really be comparable to those of advanced societies. The exercise was, in fact, never seriously attempted.

Others simply avoided the inclusion of Latin America in their comprehensive studies of modernity. David Apter perceptively did so in his insightful book Political Change. Yet in his modernization classic The Politics of Modernization he does discuss the region but his vision is, like that of other modernization literature authors, rather fuzzy regarding the capacity of the region to produce modernity or the place that it occupied in the West. Gabriel Almond's classic Political Development pays scarce attention to Latin America *per se*, but it does provide a general overview of the region. In it, its modern characteristics are poorly treated or altogether ignored. Not only did Latin America seem not to have created any modernity of its own, but it also appeared rather unable to quickly adjust to it. And, similar to many other "developing societies", struggled to "adjust" to the modernizing impulse coming from the developed countries of the world.

It was in his insightful The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, that Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba did include a case from Latin America offering a specific study of public opinion in Mexico.[80] This was a welcoming inclusion of a Latin

[80] Almond Gabriel and Sdney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Newbury Park, Sage Publications, 1989, and by the same authors, The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytical Study, Boston, Little Brown, 1980.

American country in a wider comparison including cases from both the "developing" and developed world. Yet the comparison reveals little about the western modern features of that particular civic culture, the capacity of the region to generate modernity or, more importantly, the incredible cutting edge design of the Mexican nation. Institutionally and politically the choice of Mexico, at the time a one party dominant system and a country possessing a very large peasantry that for modernization theory represented an indicator of a strong "traditional" society, was certainly not one that would easily allow to detect otherwise obvious aspects of modernity.

The nation and national identity have not been favorites in macro and structural analysis. Comparative macro theorizing has focused on other issues. Nation building and how to construct its conceptualization and/or the "emotional ties" that would connect people to institutions and "the nation" have seldom be part of the research agenda. This is a loss because many issues that are the focus of macro theorizing cannot be fully explained without a theory of modern nation building and national identity. The opposite is also true. Historians have long pioneered macro comprehensive research that explored "modern" and global developments in the region. In most of them a discussion of the nation, however, does not rank as a priority.[81] Some historians, as Halperin Donghi did with the case of

[81] See, among many others, Bergquist, Charles W. 1978. Coffee and Conflict in Colombia: 1886–1910. Duke, NC: Duke University Press and, especially, his Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986; Bulnes, Gonzalo. . Nacimiento de las repúblicas Americanas. Two volumes. Buenos Aires: Libreria la Facultad, Juan Roldán, 1927; Halperín Donghi, Tulio The Contemporary History of Latin America.

Argentina, showed these nations as modern constructs on their own. And so did others. But these interpretations remained in general alien to Modernization, World Systems, and Dependency Theory scholars. Some macro theories that included Latin America have made important comparative contributions and some discussed nation building.[82] However, most of this work did not consider Latin America as a modernizer, nor did it explore nation building from that perspective. Neither have several authors who have comparatively taken the problems of nation-state formation to task.[83] Research on

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Edited and translated by John Charles Chasteen. Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1993.

[82] I refer here, for instance, to the work done during the late 1970s and 1980s by a group of scholars that engaged in what has been called "land of recent settlement theory". See among others, Fogarty, John, Ezequiel Gallo, and Hector Dieguez. 1979. Argentina y Australia. Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato Di Tella; Fogarty, John. 1985. "Staples, Super Staples, and the Limits of Staple Theory: The Experiences of Argentina, Australia and Canada Compared." In Argentina, Australia, and Canada: Studies in Comparative Development, 1870–1965, ed. D. C. M. Platt and Guido Di Tella. New York: St. Martin's Press. From a different political economy perspective, see Schwartz, Herman M. 1989. In the Dominions of Debt: Historical Perspectives on Dependent Development. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Also, see Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens. 1992. Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. The authors take Barrington Moore's theory and attempt to explain democracy in the region through these lenses. And, of course, we have Dependency Theory, which offered a sound structural comparative theory; see specially, Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto, op. cit. Within this school, see also Sunkel, Oswaldo, and Pedro Paz. El subdesarrollo latinoamericano y la teoria del desarrollo. Madrid: Siglo XXI de España, 1970, as another valuable contribution.

[83] Among others, see Centeno, Miguel Angel, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation State in Latin America. The Pennsylvania University Press, 2002; Lopez-Alves, Fernando, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810-1930, Duke University Press, 2002; Rock, David and Fernando Lopez-Alves, "Argentina and Uruguay: Similar Cases but Divergent Paths of Institution Building: 1860-1930", Past & Present, August 2000. For a focus on Central America, see Robert H. Holden, Armies Without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America 1821-1960, Oxford University Press, 2004

the state coming from political science can also be considered a contribution to a more serious study of modernity and nation building in the region, but the problems of nation building that occupy us here or national identity have emerged only randomly in the discussion.[84] Comparative studies on revolution that include an exploration of globalization and modernization do exist, but, again, they have not focused on the formation of national identity or on Latin America as a modernizer.[85]

One of the major founders of comparative historical sociology, Barrington Moore Jr., in his cited opus to the field The Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy…, neither studied nor mentioned the region.[86] Moore either attempted to suggest that Latin American cases could not contribute anything substantial to the central questions of his book, or, most likely, was not interested or considered that it was too burdensome to include them. Was the region part of his "path" to democracy or a contributor to Communism or Fascism? We will never know Moore's thoughts on this. One

[84] See, for instance, Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[85] Work has gone from analyses of the wars of independence to Marxist movements and their impact in the twentieth century. See, among others, Humphreys, Robert Arthur, and John Lynch(ed).. The Origins of the Latin American Revolutions, 1808–1826. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1964; John Foran, Taking Power: the Origins of Third World Revolutions, Cambridge, University Press, and Jeffrey Paige Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America, Harvard University Press, 1998. See also his Agrarian Revolutions: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World, The Free Press, New York, McMillan Publishers, 1978.

[86] Moore, Barrington Jr. Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Beacon Press. 1966

cannot demand more of Moore's pioneer work. Yet given the comprehensive character of his argument it seems adequate to ask what kind of "path" to modernity, if placed in that context, Latin America would represent. Indeed, his choice not to include the area has propelled some scholars to try to reinterpret Latin America's modernity through Moore's argument about the commercialization of agriculture.[87] Was the region's "path" characterized by an imperfect "adoption" of modernity created elsewhere, or one in which these societies contributed something of their own to the construction of that Western type of modernity that Moore considers in part 1 of his book when comparing England, the United States, and France? This key question was, unfortunately, not posed by literature trying to use Moore's argument in Latin America.

Finally, we come again to culture, but this time as the foremost contribution of Latin America to the modern world and the one area in which the region does contribute to shape the global system. Latin America: not a modernizer or a globalizer but yes a culture producer, Indeed, when one looks at the literature, culture seems to be the typical Latin American product for export. In 1999 Huntington, again,

[87] See, for instance, Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens. 1992. Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. In my State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 2000, I considered Moore's argument as well but, in my view, the commercialization of agriculture in Latin America did not provoke the same political arrangements that it did in Europe, that is, democracy. In fact, in Latin America the commercialization of agriculture took place *after* a number of democratizing reforms were already in place (Colombia, Argentina). For a different and critical view of the application of Moore's argument to Chile, see Samuel Valenzuela, "Barrington Moore and the Case of Chile" in Miguel Centeno and Fernando Lopez-Alves, (eds.) The Other Mirror: Grand Theory Through The Lens of Latin America, Princeton, University Press, 2001.

examined Latin America. In his Clash of Civilizations… The region is defined as a "civilization" on its own right; again, geographically in the West but representing something else. A sort of Latin American culture (or civilization) emerges and plays a part in an ongoing clash among different "civilizations". This "Latin" culture --or civilization-- confronts others, including perhaps, although unlikely, the West.

In this argument the actual role to be played by such "Latin American culture" remains blurred, since it seems to participate only marginally in the struggles that will characterize the future. While Huntington does not talk about national identities or nations, his argument reveals that these nations are still different from and not comparable to Europe or the United States. In this argument, however, the region does acquire the status of *actor* in a world where cultural and religious wars, as opposed to ideological ones, would shape the new global system. Since Huntington bestows upon Latin America a semi-equal status to other "civilizations", one can assume that the region can become a maker of influence. Yet at the end this civilization remains a weak actor.

Other interpretations of cultural change and globalization have also granted Latin America a more important space. [88] Very much like national identity, culture can be taken as the forefront of resistance against modernity or globalization. Or it can also be understood as

[88] There are many books, guides, and approaches to culture in Latin America. See, among others, Dwight B. Health Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America: A Reader in the Social Anthropology of Middle and South America,, Random House, NY, 1965. From a different approach and topics, see Saul Sosnoswski, ed. Repression, Exile, and Democracy: Uruguayan Culture, Duke University Press, 1993.

something that enriches the process of globalization, contributing to what has been called “global culture”. Latin America is certainly a producer of culture and I cannot think of any other region of the world that has not been. What is wrong with this strong emphasis on culture is that one gets the impression that culture has become Latin America’s only important contribution to modernity or global change. Authors have seen different manifestations of “culture” (political culture, social culture, communal and solidarity culture, cultures of resistance, cultures of rebellion, revolutionary cultures, national cultures, reactive cultures, and so forth) as one of the most important aspect to be studied about the region in terms of its relation to the world and, especially, the core countries.[89] The nation and national identity are usually subsumed under this label.

Culture also seems to emerge from forgotten, wise, and ancient traditions that for all their praise have little to contribute to change, globalization, or modernity. The construction of trade structures and corporate thinking is reserved for other global actors.[90] It is fair to say

[89] Among others, see most contributions to the collection by Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore (ed.), Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of US-Latin American Relations, Duke University Press, 1998.See also Wiarda, Howard J. ed. Politics and Social Change in Latin America: Still a Distinct Tradition? Third edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Culture has also become a buzzword for many Latin American scholars who have interpreted political institutions as a result of special political cultures. See, among others, Gerardo Caetano’s work on Uruguayan political culture, a topic that has been a favorite of Uruguayan historians and political scientists. John Foran’s Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions, op. cit., represents, however, an ambitions comparative theory of revolutions that includes Latin America and wisely uses the term “culture” as an analytical comparative tool in tandem with other variables.

[90] According to a most of the times unspoken consensus, Western Europe and the United States (at times Canada) are seen as contributing hard science, economic

that, in the world of the 21st century, Latin America and most of the developing world are still seeing as culture exporters (music, art, life styles, some movies, soup-operas, food). As it has been argued, however, the region's crucial contribution to our understanding of the consolidation of the modern world and contemporary global change is far and beyond "culture" or its experimentation with liberalism and neo-liberalism. We will now examine the connection between futures, globalization, and national identity.

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development, democracy, modern state institutions, welfare, and an orderly modern "political culture". Latin America, instead, keeps supplying other kinds of art and culture.